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INTRODUCTION
With the advent of behavioral economics, scholars have begun to grasp the
complexity of forces that drive individual decisionmaking. A large body of
research suggests that even small changes in a policy's design can dramatically
affect how individuals behave in response to the policy, even when those
design changes do not alter the incentives that individuals face.' Armed with
this insight, prominent academics and policymakers have argued that
governments should take such "behavioral" patterns into account when
designing policy.
This Note applies the insights of behavioral economics to an understudied
area: the design of tax policy.' A series of recent studies suggests that, contrary
to the assumptions of conventional tax analysis, the design of a tax significantly
shapes taxpayer decisionmaking. These studies find that the more salient a tax
is-that is, the more prominent a taxed good's after-tax price-the more
consumers take the tax into account when making their purchasing decisions.
The lower the salience of a tax, the less taxpayers pay attention and hence, the
less they respond to changes in the tax's amount.
In this Note, I argue that the empirical evidence on tax salience has
important implications for the design of tax policy. Manipulating the salience
of a tax does not affect the substantive choices available to consumers-the
salience of the tax does not affect a good's real after-tax price. But because
salience affects individuals' consumption decisions, policymakers can
manipulate this dimension of tax design to better control the effects of the
taxes they impose. Put differently, my claim is that tax salience provides a new
design lever that policymakers should use to promote efficiency and other
social goals.
The recognition that policymakers should consider salience when setting
tax policy is certainly important, but on its own it is not that useful. The
challenge for policymaking lies in the next step: determining how salient a
particular tax should be. Should taxes be fully salient, entirely hidden, or
1. For a review of this research, see, for example, Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard
Thaler,A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 5o STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998).
2. See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESs (2008); Michael Grunwald, How Obama Is Using the Science
ofChange, TIME, Apr. 2,2009, http://www.time.conVtime/printou/o,8816,1889153,oo.html.
3. By the "design" of tax policy, I mean the presentation to taxpayers of a good's after-tax
price. See Aradhna Krishna & Joel Slemrod, Behavioral Public Finance: Tax Design as Price
Presentation, io INT'L TAx & PUB. FIN. 189, 189-90 (2003) (exploring how tax policy can
incorporate insights from marketing research on price presentation).
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somewhere in between? And how should governments choose between these
possibilities?
Whereas previous scholarship has focused on the binary choice between
relying on high-salience versus low-salience taxes,' governments are not
typically constrained to act in this all-or-nothing manner. Rather, policymakers
may employ a combination of high- and low-salience taxes, with a different
fraction of each being levied for every taxed good. To illustrate, consider the
case of commodity taxation, where a central determinant of salience is whether
the tax-inclusive price of a good is prominent at the time consumers make their
purchasing decisions. The salience research suggests that consumers are more
responsive to posted taxes-taxes that are included in a good's posted price-
than to equally sized register taxes-taxes that are added when the consumer
checks out at the register. Thus by manipulating the fraction of register and
posted taxes levied on a good, policymakers can finely tune the extent to which
consumers purchasing that good account for the taxes levied on it.
Once one recognizes that policymakers may fine-tune salience by using a
combination of high- and low-salience taxes, a natural question arises: what
degree of salience best promotes efficiency? That is, what combination of high-
and low-salience taxes will raise some required amount of revenue while
generating the minimum harm to consumers? On the one hand, a low-salience
tax minimizes the traditional welfare costs of taxation by mitigating the tax's
distortionary effects on consumers' purchasing behavior. But on the other
hand, low-salience taxes generate new welfare costs by driving consumers to
make mistakes. Identifying the efficient combination of high- and low-salience
taxes involves trading off between these two competing effects.
This Note develops a number of new guidelines for how policymakers
should manipulate tax salience in order to promote efficiency. Using a simple
model of consumer behavior, I first derive a baseline formula for how
policymakers should set tax salience when they have perfect control over the
extent to which consumers account for a given tax. Within a broad range of
circumstances, the formula highlights several important results: (1) fully
4. See Brian Galle, Hidden Taxes, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 59 (2009) (arguing that the desirability
of hidden taxes depends on the cognitive mechanism by which taxpayers fail to pay
attention); David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market Salience
and Political Salience, 65 TAx L. REV. 19 (2011) (arguing in favor of low-salience taxes on the
ground that their efficiency costs will be small in practice); Jacob Nussim, To Confuse and
Protect: Taxes and Consumer Protection, 1 COLUM. J. TAx L. 218 (2oo) (criticizing tax-
inclusive pricing legislation on salience grounds); Hayes Holderness, Note, Price Includes
Tax: Protecting Consumers from Tax-Exclusive Pricing, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 783
(2011) (calling for tax-inclusive pricing regulations to prevent consumers from making
mistakes in the face of low-salience taxes).
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salient taxes are never efficient; (2) fully hidden taxes are only efficient when
demand for the taxed good is entirely insensitive to income; (3) high-salience
taxes tend to be efficient for luxury goods and for goods that constitute a large
share of consumers' expenditures; and (4) low-salience taxes tend to be
efficient for goods that are easily substitutable. I then turn to the more practical
question of how policymakers might implement the efficient degree of salience
identified by the formula and show that utilizing a combination of high- and
low-salience tax instruments offers one avenue for doing so. In addition to
providing concrete guidelines, these results add important nuances to the
existing legal scholarship on tax salience.s
Beyond promoting efficient taxation, policymakers can manipulate salience
to further other social goals. Most notably, adjusting salience can affect the
distribution of a tax's burden, both between producers and consumers, and
between high- and low-income consumers. Additionally, Pigouvian taxes,
which are intended to affect taxpayer decisionmaking, pose unique
considerations for the choice of tax salience: high-salience taxes are more
effective at altering taxpayer behavior but less effective at raising revenue.
Because distributional considerations and behavior modification are sometimes
important elements in the design of tax policy, I consider how policymakers
should account for these factors when making design choices that affect a tax's
salience.
Although much of my discussion will be theoretical, the question of tax
salience is anything but abstract. Policymakers make decisions about a tax's
salience-either intentionally or not-whenever a new tax is introduced. In
particular, each new commodity tax can either be designed so that it is included
in the taxed good's posted price or added on at the register. For example, many
states have enacted or are considering enacting taxes on sugary soft drinks.6
Such taxes can either be implemented by raising the sales tax rate on soft
drinks relative to other food items or by taxing manufacturers, in which case
the tax is passed on to consumers through an increase in soft drinks' posted
price. Although this design choice shapes the salience of the tax -and hence its
5. Most notably, Gamage and Shanske argue for a general presumption in favor of low-
salience taxes on the basis of an empirical claim that consumers are likely to respond to low-
salience taxes in a particular manner. See Gamage & Shanske, supra note 4, at 68-70; infra
Subsection II.C. 3. The efficient salience formula presented here generalizes Gamage and
Shanske's presumption to the case in which consumers do not behave exactly as those
authors assume. In particular, I show that the desirability of low-salience taxes depends on
the properties of demand for the good being taxed. See infra Section II.A.
6. Cf Michael F. Jacobson & Kelly D. Brownell, Small Taxes on Soft Drinks and Snack Foods To
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effects on consumers' soft drink purchasing decisions - to my knowledge its
consideration has been absent from the many discussions of the issue.
Similarly, a number of scholars have proposed instituting a national Value
Added Tax (VAT) to help stem the growing federal deficit.' Like other
consumption taxes, the VAT can be designed in high- or low-salience ways.
For example, existing state sales tax systems may either be folded into the new
VAT system or kept separate. This design choice (among others) has important
implications for tax salience, yet despite the attention paid to VAT proposals by
academics and policymakers in recent years, the salience aspect of the decision
has received scant attention.8 As this Note will argue, design choices that affect
tax salience merit a larger role in discussions of tax policy.
Finally, apart from their practical implications for the design of tax policy,
the results presented here speak to broader questions about the appropriate
role of government in attempting to reduce its citizens' mistakes. In response
to mounting evidence that individuals exhibit systematic cognitive biases when
making important decisions, prominent behavioral law and economics scholars
have argued in favor of designing institutions in ways that "debias" individuals
to improve the quality of their decisionmaking.9 Such interventions are
appealing in the many circumstances in which decisionmakers exhibit cognitive
biases, such as when taking out mortgages, choosing a prescription drug plan,
or engaging in risky behaviors. However, my results demonstrate that in at
least certain contexts, debiasing is actually counterproductive. In particular, I
show that even when the government has the option of designing its tax
system in a way that prevents taxpayers from making mistakes, taxpayers
themselves are actually worse off when it chooses to do so. Thus in the case of
commodity taxation, calls for debiasing deserve a skeptical look.
The remainder of the Note is organized as follows. Part I introduces the
notion of tax salience and establishes the relationship between salience and
efficiency. Part II constitutes the Note's primary contribution: I derive a
formula that identifies the efficient degree of tax salience for a taxed good
based on the nature of consumers' demand for that good. I also explain how
policymakers can implement the efficient degree of salience by combining
available taxes of varying salience. Part III turns from simple efficiency
7. For examples, see Michael J. Graetz, Taxes that Work: A Simple American Plan, 58 FLA. L.
REV. 1043 (2006), and sources cited in Nussim, supra note 4, at 225 n-31.
S. Indeed, the only scholarship I could identify discussing VAT design issues from a behavioral
perspective is Galle, supra note 4, at 63; and Nussim, supra note 4, at 221.
9. See, e.g., Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199
(2006).
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considerations to factors left out of the efficient tax formula and explores how
their inclusion changes the implications of the analysis.
I. BACKGROUND CONCEPTS
This Part reviews the conceptual foundations necessary to understand the
results in Part II. I first review the empirical literature concerning tax salience
and then turn to the link between tax salience and efficiency.
A. Tax Salience
The salience of a tax measures the prominence of a taxed good's after-tax
price to consumers."o High-salience taxes are accessible to consumers -they are
both noticeable and easy to process." A salience effect occurs when consumers
account more for high-salience taxes than for low-salience taxes when making
their purchasing decisions. The presence of a salience effect suggests that
taxpayers will adjust their behavior more in response to a high-salience tax
than to a low-salience tax, even when both have exactly the same economic
effect on the taxpayer's budget."
A growing literature within behavioral economics suggests that salience
effects may play an important role in shaping how individuals respond to
taxation." Two of the most important pieces of evidence that tax salience
affects individual decisionmaking are reported by Raj Chetty, Adam Looney,
1o. Note that I define salience in terms of the prominence of the after-tax price, not in terms of
the tax itself. Thus an excise tax typically has high salience because the amount of the tax is
included in the posted price, even though consumers may not know how much of the price
they pay is tax rather than producer price. This definition captures what Deborah Schenk
refers to as "economic salience," Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting the Salience Bias in Designing
Taxes, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 272-73 (2011), and what Gamage and Shanske refer to as
"market salience," Gamage & Shanske, supra note 4, at 20.
ii. Galle, supra note 4, at 62.
12. There is an important distinction between consumers who underreact to taxes due to
salience and those who underreact due to lack of knowledge about the tax rate. If taxpayers
remember that a tax exists, but are uncertain as to its size, they might account for the
expected value of the tax. See David Weisbach, Is Knowledge of the Tax Law Socially Desirable?
8 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 563, 2011),
http://ssrn.conm/abstract=1895572. However, Chetty, Looney, and Kroft present evidence
suggesting that at least some of consumers' underreaction to taxes is likely due to a salience
effect rather than to mere ignorance of the tax rate. Raj Chetty, Adam Looney & Kory Kroft,
Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1145, 1165 (2009).
13. I summarize the literature here briefly. For a more thorough review, see Gamage & Shanske,
supra note 4, at 26-54.
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and Kory Kroft in their article Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence,
describing an experiment and observational study that they conducted on the
subject.14 In the experiment, they investigated the hypothesis that consumers
fail to incorporate the full sales-tax-inclusive price of a good when making
purchasing decisions. The authors posted tags on a number of grocery store
items, displaying the items' tax-inclusive prices." They found that doing so -
i.e., making the sales tax more salient -reduced demand for the taxed goods by
eight percent." These results suggest that absent such treatment, consumers
were not fully accounting for the sales tax when deciding how much of a good
to buy. 17
In a separate study, Chetty, Looney, and Kroft investigated the importance
of tax salience by analyzing state-by-state changes in beer consumption." Beer
is taxed in two ways in most states: through excise taxes, which appear in
beer's posted price, and through sales taxes, which are typically added at the
register." By linking state and time variation in sales and excise tax rates to
changes in a state's beer consumption, the authors were able to compare how
consumers responded to excise and sales taxes.2 o The authors found that
consumers reduced beer purchases significantly more in response to the high-
salience taxes (the excise taxes) than to the low-salience taxes (the sales
taxes)." More recently, these findings have been replicated in the context of
cigarette taxation, at least for high-income consumers."
In addition to comparing how consumer demand responds to high- and
low-salience taxes, a number of authors have approached the subject from a
different angle -investigating the extent to which the design of a tax affects
14. Chetty et al., supra note 12.
1s. See id. at 1150-52.
16. See id. at 1153-56.
17. One potential problem with this experiment, which the authors acknowledge, is the
possibility of "Hawthorne effects." For example, it could have been the mere presence of the
tags that deterred consumers from purchasing the tagged goods, rather than the heightened
salience of the sales tax. See id. at 1146-47. The other studies described in this Part avoid this
concern because they are observational in nature.
18. Id. at 1158-64.
19. Id. at 1158.
20. Id. at 1158-59.
21. See id. at 1164.
22. Jacob Goldin & Tatiana Homonoff, Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Cigarette Tax Salience and
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consumers' awareness of and political support for the tax. In one such study,
Amy Finkelstein investigated the role of salience in highway toll collection."
Electronic toll collection systems (e.g., E-ZPass systems) are less salient than
traditional highway tolls because drivers do not need to carry or count the
required cash. Finkelstein found that upon the adoption of an E-ZPass-style
system, drivers' behavior became significantly less sensitive to changes in the
toll rate, suggesting that the electronic toll collection system reduced market
salience.
Marika Cabral and Caroline Hoxby also investigated how salience affects
behavior, focusing on the particular case of the property tax.2 s Some
jurisdictions allow property taxes to be paid by escrow, so that the property tax
is automatically deducted from taxpayers' bank accounts along with their
mortgage payments. In those cases, the tax is less salient than when taxpayers
must write separate property tax checks." The authors found that property
taxes were higher in jurisdictions that collected the tax in the escrow system,
consistent with the idea that tax salience affects taxpayers' perceptions and
reactions to the tax.27
In summary, a number of recent studies have investigated the role of tax
salience in shaping taxpayer behavior. By comparing taxpayers' responsiveness
to high- and low-salience taxes, these studies find that the less salient a tax is,
the less consumers appear to take it into account when making their decisions.
Although many of these empirical findings are quite recent, they appear to hold
across a variety of contexts, suggesting that the phenomenon is not simply an
artifact of a particular institution. The remainder of this Note considers the
normative implications of this line of research.
23. Amy Finkelstein, E-ZTax: Tax Salience and Tax Rates, 124 Q.J. ECON. 969 (2009).
24. Id. at 986-go. Finkelstein also found that under such systems, toll-setting behavior becomes
less sensitive to the local election calendar, suggesting a reduction in political salience as
well. Id. at 1002-05.
25. Marika Cabral & Caroline Hoxby, The Hated Property Tax: Salience, Tax Rates, and Tax Revolts
(2010) (unpublished manuscript), http://economics.stanford.edu/files/Hoxby3_2.pdf.
26. Id. at 2-4.
27. Id. at 38-39. The proposed mechanism underlying these findings is that that taxpayers are
less likely to "revolt" against property taxes when they perceive the property tax burden to
be lower than it really is.
28. Of course, I am not claiming that salience is equally important in all tax contexts. It seems
less likely, for example, that the salience of the corporate income tax greatly affects corporate
decisionmaking, given the large incentives that exist for firms to determine the optimal way
to respond to the tax code. See, e.g., Charles Duhigg & David Kocieniewski, How Apple




SALES TAX NOT INCLUDED
B. Efficiency Analysis and Tax Policy
All commodity taxes make consumers worse off to some extent by
transferring individuals' resources to the government. 9 Because the goal of a
tax is to raise revenue for funding the government, the welfare loss that comes
from this transfer is largely inescapable; even well-designed taxes cannot avoid
it. However, most taxes also generate an excess burden-that is, they harm
consumers over and above the amount strictly necessary to raise the revenue
they take in.3o The goal of efficient tax policy is to raise the needed amount of
revenue while minimizing harm to taxpayers.
To understand why two taxes that take in the same amount of revenue can
generate different welfare costs, it is crucial to understand the sources of excess
burden. Commodity taxes generate excess burden by distorting consumers'
decisions about which goods to purchase. When the government imposes a tax
on a good, consumers respond by shifting their consumption away from the
taxed good toward relatively cheaper alternatives. Consumers who substitute
away from the taxed good do not contribute to the tax's revenue; but, having
switched their consumption to a less desirable bundle of goods in order to
avoid the tax, they are still worse off because of the tax. The larger these
"avoidance costs," the greater the tax's excess burden."
An example may help illustrate why taxes generate excess burden."
Suppose one thousand consumers in the town of Fruitsville decide each day
whether to purchase an apple or an orange from their neighborhood fruit
vendor. Both types of fruit cost $1, and the population's preferences are divided
such that five hundred consumers buy oranges and five hundred buy apples.
Now suppose that the mayor of Fruitsville imposes a $o.io posted tax on
oranges (apples escape untaxed because of Fruitsville's powerful apple lobby),
29. Assuming, of course, that the burden of the tax is not fully shifted to producers, and setting
aside the benefits to taxpayers of the government services their taxes fund.
30. My presentation of excess burden is similar to other discussions of the topic. See, e.g., Alan J.
Auerbach, The Theory of Excess Burden and Optimal Taxation, in 1 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC
EcoNoMics 61 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 1985).
31. In the standard approach to welfare analysis, excess burden is identical to avoidance costs.
As explained in Section II.C, infra, this identity ceases to hold once one accounts for the
possibility of consumer mistakes.
32. To be clear, I am far from the first to use examples like this to explain the concept of excess
burden. See, e.g., HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 304-08 (7th ed. 200S).
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bringing the after-tax price of an orange to $1.1o. 3 Faced with the higher price,
orange consumers are unhappy. Four hundred of them decide to keep buying
oranges ("the Stayers") and shell out the extra dime each morning. But one
hundred consumers stop buying oranges and start buying apples instead ("the
Switchers").
What are the welfare costs of this tax? For the four hundred Stayers, the
welfare cost of the tax stems from the extra income spent on their daily orange.
As a group, the Stayers are collectively transferring $40 to the government each
day. As such, they are worse off because they can no longer spend that money
on other goods. This resource transfer from consumers to the government
constitutes the revenue cost of the tax.
However, the Stayers are not the only ones harmed by the tax; the one
hundred Switchers are worse off as well. Before the tax, each Switcher was
faced with the choice of whether to pay $1 for an apple or $1 for an orange.
Assuming the consumers in Fruitsville are rational, the fact that Switchers
chose oranges in the pretax world implies that the members of that group
prefer paying $1 for an orange to paying $i for an apple. After the tax, the
Switchers still pay $1 each morning, but instead of getting an orange, they only
get an apple. Consequently, even though Switchers are not actually paying the
tax, they are worse off because of it. This welfare cost to the Switchers
constitutes the tax's excess burden.
The Fruitsville example illustrates a general principle of tax policy. When
governments levy taxes that depend on behavior (such as whether one buys an
orange or an apple), taxpayers will change their behavior to reduce their tax
liability. This avoidance behavior creates a welfare loss to taxpayers over and
above the revenue costs of the tax. The more avoidance behavior that a tax
generates, the greater the excess burden of the tax will be. Thus, as a rule of
thumb, policymakers concerned with efficiency seek to design taxes in ways
that minimize the extent to which consumers substitute away from the taxed
good.
C. Low-Salience Taxes and Efficiency
Until Chetty, Looney, and Kroft's seminal paper on the subject, economists
lacked a suitable framework for investigating the efficiency properties of low-
268
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concerned with such matters should assume appropriate elasticities for the full price to be
passed through to consumers.
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salience taxation.' This Section explains those authors' insights in a
nontechnical way. After reviewing the basic relationship between tax salience
and efficiency, I will be ready to turn to our central question: how should a
government design its taxes to best exploit that relationship?
i. Efficiency Benefits ofLow-Salience Taxation
The efficiency appeal of low-salience taxes stems from their potential to
reduce avoidance costs. According to the empirical evidence described above,
the lower a tax's salience is, the less consumers account for the tax when
deciding how much of the taxed good to purchase. As a result, a low-salience
tax induces less substitution away from the taxed good than does a high-
salience tax of the same size. By reducing the salience of a tax-for instance by
switching from an excise tax to a sales tax -governments can reduce avoidance
costs by reducing the extent to which the tax distorts consumers' purchasing
decisions.
To illustrate, return to the Fruitsville example and suppose that the city
must raise $40 a day by taxing oranges. We saw that one way to achieve this
goal was to levy a $0.10 posted tax on oranges. Such an approach would bring
in the desired amount of revenue but would generate avoidance costs by
motivating some consumers to switch to apples to avoid paying the new after-
tax price of oranges. Suppose instead that the city chose to raise its revenue
through a low-salience tax on oranges. For simplicity, we will assume that the
new tax is completely hidden, in that consumers ignore the new tax entirely
when deciding which fruit to purchase." What are the welfare effects of the
hidden tax?
Because consumers ignore the hidden tax, their consumption of oranges
does not change once the tax is imposed (i.e., there are still five hundred
consumers buying oranges after the tax is imposed). As a result, the size of the
tax needed to raise a given amount of revenue is smaller than when the tax was
designed in the high-salience way. Whereas raising $40 per day required a
posted tax of $o.io, a low-salience tax of $0.08 raises the same amount.
Moreover, because the low-salience tax does not cause consumers to alter their
fruit consumption, it does not generate any avoidance costs. Those who would
34. See Chetty et al., supra note 12, at 1170-75.
3s. The assumption that the tax is fully hidden is for ease of exposition. The qualitative story is
unchanged as long as the tax is less than fully salient, i.e., as long as consumers fail to
account for it fully when making their purchasing decisions.
36. For the high-salience tax: $o.io - 400 = $40. For the low-salience tax: $o.o8 * 500 = $40.
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have switched from oranges to apples under the posted tax -and suffered as a
result-still end up consuming their fruit of choice when the tax is hidden.
2. Efficiency Costs ofLow-Salience Taxation
The analysis thus far suggests that low-salience taxes unambiguously
improve efficiency. That conclusion would be correct under the standard
framework of tax analysis. However, the traditional approach to efficiency
analysis assumes rational behavior on the part of consumers, an assumption
called into doubt by the empirical findings discussed in Section I.A. Unless one
were prepared to believe that consumers actually care more about price
increases that show up in the posted price than about price increases that are
added at the register, the observed discrepancy in responsiveness between the
tax designs suggests that consumers make systematic mistakes when deciding
what to buy. Consequently, an approach to welfare analysis that assumes
perfect rationality on the part of consumers is ill-suited for studying the choice
between high- and low-salience taxes.
If one accepts that the attenuated consumer response to low-salience taxes
reflects a mistake on the part of consumers rather than an intentional choice,
the conclusions of the traditional approach to tax analysis no longer hold. In
particular, low-salience taxes may reduce avoidance costs but still harm
consumers by driving them to make mistakes when deciding which good to
purchase. Thus, in addition to considering revenue and avoidance costs when
assessing a tax's efficiency, one must also account for budgeting mistakes.
Back in Fruitsville, it is easy to see why low-salience taxes can generate
budgeting mistakes. When the government imposed the posted tax on
oranges, one hundred consumers switched from oranges to apples. Because the
tax was fully salient, consumers fully accounted for oranges' higher after-tax
price. Judging from the Switchers' behavior, we can draw two conclusions
about the preferences of consumers in that group: first, Switchers prefer
spending $1 on an orange to spending $i on an apple. Second, Switchers prefer
spending $1 on an apple to spending $1.io on an orange.
Now consider the Switchers' behavior under the low-salience tax. Because
they ignore the tax, the Switchers continue purchasing oranges: they end up
spending $i.o8 on an orange instead of spending $i on an apple. This behavior
constitutes a welfare cost to a consumer who would have chosen differently
had she taken the low-salience tax into account. Put differently, a Switcher who
accidentally spends $1.08 on an orange when she would have preferred
spending $1 on an apple will benefit from having the orange instead of the
270
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apple, but will suffer by having $0.08 less to spend on other goods." Thus, the
question of whether the high- or low-salience tax is more efficient for
Fruitsville hinges on the relative magnitudes of the avoidance costs generated
by the posted tax and the budgeting mistakes induced by the low-salience tax.
Again, the Fruitsville example illustrates a general point. Under the
standard approach to tax analysis, the total welfare costs of a tax are given by
the sum of revenue costs (resources transferred from consumers to the
government) and avoidance costs (changes in consumer behavior made to
avoid the tax)." Once one accounts for departures from rational
decisionmaking, however, a new type of cost must be taken into account:
budgeting mistakes. Thus for a tax that is less than fully salient, the total
welfare cost is given by the sum of revenue costs, avoidance costs, and
budgeting mistakes.
Table 1 summarizes the discussion so far by contrasting the welfare effects
of high- and low-salience taxes. To isolate the efficiency effects, assume that
the tax rates are chosen so that both designs bring in the same amount of
revenue.
Table1.
TYPE OF WELFARE COSTS GENERATED
AHigh-salience Large Small Equal for high- andlow-sabence taxLow-salience Small Large designs
Table i highlights the efficiency tradeoff involved in choosing between a
high- and low-salience tax design. Under a high-salience tax, consumers
choose optimally when deciding how much of each good to purchase, but their
propensity to substitute away from the taxed good generates avoidance costs.
At the other extreme, a low-salience tax sidesteps the avoidance costs
traditionally associated with taxation, but does so at the cost of driving
consumers to make budgeting mistakes. Whether the high- or the low-salience
tax does the better job of minimizing harm to consumers while raising the
37. Of course, the other orange consumers who do not switch (the Stayers) will be strictly
better off under the low-salience tax by virtue of the tax being $0.08 instead of $o.1o.
38. See generally Auerbach, supra note 30.
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required amount of revenue ultimately depends on the relative magnitudes of
avoidance costs and budgeting mistakes associated with the taxed good.
II. FINE-TUNING TAX SALIENCE
Thus far, I have followed the literature by treating as binary the choice
between high-salience taxes on the one hand and low-salience taxes on the
other. In reality, however, policymakers are not constrained in this all-or-
nothing way. Instead, they can manipulate a tax's design so that it is
somewhere between fully salient and fully hidden. In particular, policymakers
frequently enjoy both high- and low-salience methods for taxing a particular
good. The greater the fraction of the tax imposed in the low-salience way, the
less consumers will take the tax into account when making their purchasing
decisions. This observation begs the question: how should the government
choose among the various available tax instruments in order to best promote
efficiency?
A. Identifying the Efficient Degree of Tax Salience
The qualitative discussion so far has highlighted a number of factors that
influence the efficient degree of salience for a tax. Obtaining a precise answer to
the efficiency problem, however, requires the use of a formal economic
model." Although I confine the mathematical details of the model to the
Appendix, I provide an overview of the approach and discuss the main results
here.
39. The advantage of a formal economic model is that it allows one to analyze the costs and
benefits of changing tax salience more systematically than has been attempted before. See,
e.g., Gamage & Shanske, supra note 4, at 68-69 (focusing on the case in which no trade-off
exists because consumers fully account for the income effects generated by low-salience
taxes); Nussim, supra note 4, at 242 (identifying the two opposing forces in the desirability
of low-salience taxation, but concluding that "[t] hese two opposing effects on social welfare
should be traded off, and hence no conclusion on price indication can be a priori correct").
Chetty, Looney, and Kroft also utilize a formal economic model but do so to answer a
different question than what I consider here. In particular, those authors extend the
conventional formulas for tax incidence and excess burden to the case in which taxes are less
than fully salient. See Chetty, et al., supra note 12. Whereas their results speak to the welfare
costs of a tax with a given salience, I focus on an antecedent question: how salient to make
the tax in the first place. More precisely, knowing the excess burden of a low-salience tax is
not sufficient to determine what the efficient mix between high- and low-salience taxes
should be. Computing the efficient mix requires the additional step of comparing a low-
salience tax's excess burden against the excess burden that would be generated by a high-
salience tax, accounting for differences in revenue generation between the two types of tax.
272
122:258 2012
SALES TAX NOT INCLUDED
Consider a government that must raise a fixed amount of revenue by taxing
some good X. Consistent with the empirical evidence described in Section I.A,
I assume the presence of a salience effect: when making their purchasing
decisions, consumers account more for high-salience taxes than for low-
salience taxes. I define I as the salience of the tax on X. That is, 9 measures the
degree to which consumers underreact to changes in the tax relative to changes
in the posted price of X.40 Thus when 0 = i, the tax is fully salient. When
0 = o, the tax is entirely hidden.41
As a starting point, suppose that the government has perfect control over
the salience of its tax instruments, so that it may select any value of 9 between
o and 1.42 The efficient degree of tax salience is the value of 9 that makes
consumers as well off as possible while raising the needed amount of revenue
from taxes on X. I denote the efficient degree of tax salience by 0*.
As shown in the Appendix, it turns out that under plausible assumptions,4
0* is given by a simple formula. For any good X, the efficient degree of salience
40. For example, a tax has salience of 0.5 if consumers adjust their purchasing behavior by half
as much in response to changes in the tax as they do in response to changes in the taxed
good's posted price. Note that by employing the same parameter to describe both tax
salience and taxpayer responsiveness, I am assuming the existence of a salience effect.
41. Depending on the specifics of how consumers make purchasing decisions, a tax that
consumers entirely ignore could hypothetically be associated with a 0 > o (i.e., if the taxed
good is the absolute last good purchased before running out of money). In practice, this
possibility is unlikely to occur.
42. This setting, in which the government can precisely choose 9, is intended to be illustrative
and should be taken as a baseline rather than a literal description of reality. After all, the
government does not control 0 directly; it can only adjust the design of a tax to make it
more or less prominent to consumers. To precisely select 9, policymakers would need to
know exactly how consumers would react to each possible tax design and have sufficient
design choices available to span the range of Os between o and 1. I extend the analysis to a
more realistic setting in Section II.B.
43. As Gamage and Shanske emphasize, the welfare implications of less-than-fully salient taxes
will generally depend on exactly how consumers make their budgeting mistakes-for
example, whether consumers purchase luxuries before necessities. Gamage & Shanske, supra
note 4, at 66-67. However, I borrow a trick from Chetty, Looney, and Kroft: under the
assumption that tax salience only affects consumers' well-being through consumption
outcomes (rather than through tax design directly), one can conduct welfare analysis
without making specific assumptions about consumers' budgeting process. Chetty et al.,
supra note 12, at 1148; see also Raj Chetty, The Simple Economics of Salience and Taxation 9-11
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15246, 2009), http://www.nber.org
/papers/ws1246.pdf (describing this technique). I implement this approach in Section II.B
and consider situations in which it might fail in Section II.C. Note that the assumption that
taxes affect utility only through consumption is standard in the public finance literature. See,
e.g., Auerbach, supra note 30, at 65 (specifying agents' utility functions in terms of
consumption).
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for taxes on X depends on the nature of demand for X. More precisely, the
formula for 0* balances the income and substitution effects associated with an
increase in X's price.4 The efficient salience formula is given by:
0*= 1 C
6 (1 - CO 77 )
where z denotes taxes as a share of Xs after-tax price, c refers to the budget
share of expenditures on X, q measures the income effect, ec measures the
substitution effect, and E reflects the sum of the income and substitution
effects.4s
In other words, the efficient degree of salience is given by a fraction in
which the numerator measures the income sensitivity of X and the
denominator reflects the income sensitivity plus the substitutability of X. The
quantities that enter the optimal tax formula are frequently estimated for a
range of goods, and so should be readily available to policymakers.46
Armed with the efficient salience formula and the appropriate empirical
parameters, policymakers can calculate exactly what degree of salience best
promotes efficiency for any given taxed good. Even in circumstances in which
policymakers lack the exact data necessary to calculate 0*, however, the
efficient tax salience formula yields a number of important lessons about how
salient taxes on a particular good should be.
First, fully salient taxes (0 = 1) are never efficient. Although low-salience
taxes harm consumers by causing budgeting mistakes, the welfare cost of those
mistakes is trivially low when the tax is almost fully salient (e.g., 0 0.99).
Intuitively, taxes that are close to fully salient only drive a small wedge between
optimal and actual consumption, so that the marginal utility of income
accidentally spent on the taxed good is still close to the marginal utility of
income spent on other goods. Thus a government that relies exclusively on a
44. Recall that a price increase is associated with both an income effect and a substitution effect.
The income effect measures how a price increase in X affects total income and how that
change in income affects how much X the consumer wants to buy. In contrast, the
substitution effect measures how consumers substitute away from X following a price
increase, holding income constant.
45. More precisely, q is the income-elasticity of X, e is the uncompensated own-price elasticity
of demand, and ec is the compensated (Hicksian) own-price elasticity of demand.
46. See, e.g., Angus Deaton, Estimation of Own- and Cross-Price Elasticities from Household Survey
Data, 36 J. ECONOMETIUCS 7 (1987). One wrinkle is that the elasticity values that enter the
efficient salience formula are evaluated at 9 = 1. For more on this point, see Jacob Goldin,
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posted tax can always improve efficiency by slightly increasing the fraction of
the tax added on at the register because the associated welfare loss of doing so
will be trivially small.
This simple result has important policy implications. First, it provides a
reason to be skeptical of tax-inclusive pricing regulations of the type common
in Europe, which require retailers to display the full amount of the tax in the
posted price that consumers observe. Although such regulations may
potentially be justified on other grounds," this result suggests that alternative
policies might better promote efficiency. More broadly, this result suggests
that even when a government has the ability to fully prevent consumers from
making mistakes in this domain, it is generally not efficient for it to do so.
The second important result that follows from the efficient salience
formula is that fully hidden taxes (9 = o) are only efficient when demand for
the taxed good is entirely insensitive to income. 8 Otherwise, policymakers can
improve the efficiency of a fully hidden tax by slightly raising its salience.
Again, the intuition is that very low-salience taxes generate very small
avoidance costs-the marginal utility of consuming the untaxed good is close
to the marginal utility of consuming the taxed good. Hence, when 9 is close to
o, the efficiency gains from reducing budgeting mistakes will always dominate
the accompanying small increase in avoidance costs.
These two results -that fully salient taxes are never efficient and that fully
hidden taxes are only efficient in quite limited cases - suggest an important role
for semi-salient taxation. Rather than rely entirely on a tax for which
consumers fully account or fully ignore, policymakers can better promote
efficiency by designing taxes that will have salience between those extremes.
A third implication of the efficient salience formula is that low-salience
taxes are more efficient for goods that are easily substitutable (for example,
apples and oranges in the Fruitsville scenario). Recall that the avoidance cost of
a tax depends on two factors: first, the size of the tax, and second, the
substitutability of the taxed good. Also recall that the welfare benefit of
reducing a tax's salience is that it accommodates a reduction in the tax's size.
47. See infra Part III.
48. In that case, an entirely hidden tax is efficient because it is equivalent to a lump-sum tax -
the consumption bundle attained is the same under each. To see why, note that a lump-sum
tax does not affect relative prices; it only decreases the consumer's income, which, by
assumption, does not change the amount of X the consumer chooses relative to the pretax
state. Similarly, by its definition, the imposition of a fully hidden tax does not change the
amount of X the consumer chooses to purchase. Finally, the amount of income left over to
spend on other goods is also the same in both cases -equal to pretax income minus the
amount of the tax. Chetry et al., supra note 12, at 1173.
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So the more substitutable the taxed good is, the larger the avoidance costs
generated by the tax will be, and the greater the efficiency gains from reducing
those avoidance costs by lowering the tax's size. Put differently, when the taxed
good is highly substitutable, each reduction in tax size generates more "bang
for the buck" in terms of the welfare gains that result.4'
Fourth, high-salience taxes tend to be more efficient for luxury goods -i.e.,
when demand for the taxed good is highly sensitive to income.so When the
government imposes a low-salience tax, consumption of the taxed good does
not change much, but the amount spent on the good increases. A consumer in
this position has less income to spend on other goods than before, but is still
purchasing about the same amount of the taxed good. When demand for the
taxed good is relatively insensitive to income, the resulting state of affairs is
similar to what a fully rational consumer would choose to do if faced with a
reduction in her income. In contrast, when demand for the taxed good is
highly income elastic, the consumption allocation that the inattentive
consumer ends up with is quite different than what a rational consumer would
have chosen. As noted above, in the extreme case where demand for the taxed
good is entirely insensitive to income, budgeting mistake costs are zero because
the inattentive consumer's consumption is exactly equal to what a rational
consumer would have chosen if faced with an equivalent reduction of income.
Finally, the efficient salience formula implies that high-salience taxes are
efficient for "important" goods - goods that constitute a large share of
consumers' total expenditures. Intuitively, the greater the proportion of their
income consumers spend on the taxed good, the more that accidentally failing
to substitute away from the taxed good will undermine their purchasing
power, and hence, the more harmful the budgeting mistake will be. For
example, gasoline typically constitutes a relatively large share of consumer
49. This result conflicts with the conclusion reached by Brian Galle, who writes that "hidden
taxes are more likely to be welfare-increasing for inelastically demanded goods." Galle, supra
note 4, at 81. One difference between our approaches is that Galle considers the presence of
producer surplus, a possibility ruled out by my assumption of constant returns to scale. It is
difficult to draw unambiguous conclusions about tax efficiency in the case of decreasing-
returns-to-scale production technology, which is when producer surplus would occur. See,
e.g., Chetty, supra note 43, at 17 n.13 (noting that one cannot obtain an analytical expression
for a low-salience tax's deadweight loss under non-zero producer surplus). The tension
between the two approaches may also be smaller than it first appears due to a typographical
error in Galle's text. See Galle, supra note 4, at 81 (using "inelastically" rather than
"elastically" in the first paragraph on this page).
5o. This result assumes that taxes are not a large fraction of the taxed good's pretax price. When
taxes are very high relative to the pretax price, the efficient degree of tax salience may either
be higher or lower for luxury goods. In such cases, one should determine optimal salience by
using the optimal salience formula directly rather than relying on this rule of thumb.
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expenditures and is relatively difficult to substitute (at least for consumers
living in regions without substantial mass-transit alternatives to driving)."
Consequently, policymakers should generally design gasoline taxes in relatively
high-salience ways."
In summary, the efficient salience formula provides a target for
policymakers seeking to raise revenue in ways that will minimize harm to
taxpayers. Calculating 0* for a particular taxed good does require information
about demand for that good, but for many goods, the required parameters are
frequently estimated. Even when the exact information needed to calculate 0 *
is unavailable, the formula still provides a number of useful guidelines about
the types of goods for which relatively low-salience taxes will be most
appropriate.
B. Combining High- and Low-Salience Taxes To Implement the
Efficient Degree of Tax Salience
So far I have derived 0* assuming that the government enjoys perfect
control over the salience of its tax instruments. In practice, however,
governments lack this degree of control: even if policymakers could shape a
tax's salience by manipulating its design, it is unlikely that they could do so
with the precision needed to attain any arbitrary value of 9. But even without
perfect control, a government often has access to two or more taxes that differ
in their salience. For example, if a government seeks to tax purchases of some
good X, it can usually do so either through a posted tax (9 = 1) or through a
register tax (9 < 1). The key insight in this Section is that when the
government has access to both a high-salience tax and a low-salience tax, it can
replicate many of the efficiency benefits from manipulating salience directly by
instead shifting the degree to which it relies on high- and low-salience designs.
More precisely, suppose that the government can levy two types of taxes on
X to raise some required amount of revenue: a high-salience tax (t;,) and a low-
salience tax (ti). The two taxes are associated with salience values of Oh and 01
respectively, such that o < a < , 5 1. How should the government choose
between the high- and low-salience taxes in order to best promote efficiency?
51. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Expenditures in 20o8, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR
(2010), http://www.bls.gov/cex/csxanno8.pdf; Jonathan E. Hughes, Christopher R. Knittel
& Daniel Sperling, Evidence of a Shift in the Short-Run Price Elasticity of Gasoline Demand
(Nat'l. Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12,530, 2006), http://www.nber.org
/papers/w2530.pdf.
52. This guideline is consistent with common practice, as gasoline taxes are typically
incorporated into the posted price per gallon.
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Should it rely fully on th, fully on t, or instead utilize a combination of the two?
And if it utilizes a combination, how should it choose the fraction of each to
rely upon?
It turns out that under similar assumptions to those employed in Section
II.A, the answer to these questions is given by a simple weighted average in
which the government chooses how much to rely on each tax by comparing the
salience of that tax to the efficient degree of salience for the good being taxed.54
Formally, let p denote the fraction of taxes levied on X using the low-salience
design, p = t / (t, + th). Define 0* to be the efficient degree of salience for a tax
on X, using the same formula as before. Then the efficient degree of reliance on
the low-salience tax is simply the value of p that solves the following
equation:
p6A +(i P )0h = *
To illustrate this result, suppose that a government decides to levy a tax
on chocolate, and so must choose whether to include that tax in chocolate's
posted price or whether to levy the tax when consumers check out at the
register. Let us assume that the posted tax is fully salient (Oh = 1), and that the
register tax has a salience of o.5 ( 0 .5).5s Finally, suppose that the estimates
arrived at by researchers investigating the demand for chocolate imply that the
efficient degree of salience for chocolate is 0*= 0.67. Then the efficient tax
salience formula suggests that the government should include one-third of the
chocolate tax in the posted price and levy two-thirds of the tax at the register.s"
The results in this Section show that even when policymakers lack perfect
control over a tax's salience, they can still promote efficiency by strategically
combining the various tax instruments at their disposal. In the next Section, I
s3. Indeed, my derivation of this result relies on weaker assumptions than the derivation of the
efficient salience formula because I do not make assumptions about the specific order in
which consumers purchase goods. See Goldin, supra note 46, at 5.
54. For a formal derivation of this result, see id. at to-n.
ss. Recall that a tax having a salience of o. implies that consumers respond to a $1 increase in
that tax in the same way that they respond to a $o.5o increase in the taxed good's posted
price.
56. Combining high- and low-salience tax instruments to implement 0 * requires different
information than manipulating 9* directly because policymakers must know the salience of
the available tax instruments. Even without knowing that information precisely, however,
the result still provides a rough idea of which direction to move. For example, when 0* is
very low, efficient tax design probably requires relying as much as possible on the low-
salience tax, and one may be able to infer which tax is less salient even without knowing
exactly how salient it is.
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consider challenges that may arise when using this approach to implement the
efficient degree of salience.
C. Challenges to Implementing the Efficient Degree of Tax Salience
1. The Efficient Degree of Tax Salience Might Be Outside the
Range ofAvailable Tax Instruments
In Section II.B I showed how policymakers can combine available tax
instruments of fixed salience to mirror the efficiency of a single tax with
salience 0*. However, an immediate problem arises when the efficient degree
of salience is not within the salience range of the available tax instruments -
that is, when Oh< 0* or 0 > 0*. For example, suppose that for some good X, we
estimate that 9 = 0.3 and Oh= 0.5, and we compute that 0*= 0.25. How should
the government choose between the available tax instruments in such
circumstances?
A straightforward option is simply for the government to fully rely on the
available tax instrument with salience closest to 0*. That is, when 0* is less
than 9, the government would only utilize t, for raising revenue from X.
Intuitively, when the efficient degree of salience is lower than what is feasible,
the government can best promote efficiency by setting salience as low as
possible. Similarly, when 0* is greater than 0h, the government could choose to
rely entirely on th, making the tax as salient as possible.s7 Although this
approach of choosing the highest or lowest salience tax available is certainly a
reasonable course of action when 0* is outside of the [0, Oh] range, other
approaches that better promote efficiency will sometimes be available.
First, suppose that the government has access to subsidies in addition to
taxes, which it can levy on purchases of X. Like taxes, subsidies can be designed
in ways that have varying degrees of salience; to name a few examples (perhaps
with declining degrees of salience), subsidies can be built into a good's posted
price, added on at the register, or provided after the fact through income tax
deductions or credits. In such cases, the government can implement 0* by
combining taxes and subsidies instead of only relying on taxes.
To understand how a combination of taxes and subsidies can expand the
range of attainable 0* values, note that a subsidy enters the efficient salience
formula just like a tax, but with a negative sign. Thus policymakers may
implement 0* by utilizing a subsidy in the same form as the available tax
57. Because governments typically have access to posted taxes (which are fully salient), the
problem of 9 * < 6 is more likely to occur than 9 * > ,.
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instrument.' 8 Simply solving the efficient salience formula for the case in which
0* is outside of the [9, ,] range allows one to calculate the tax-subsidy
combination that best promotes efficiency. For example, when 9, > 9*, the
government can best promote efficiency by raising its revenue through a low-
salience tax in conjunction with a high-salience subsidy.'9 In the numerical
example described above, solving the efficient salience equation (allowing for
subsidies) yields ti = -5th; that is, the efficient combination is to set the low-
salience tax at five times the amount of the high-salience subsidy.o Intuitively,
the combination of the high-salience subsidy and the low-salience tax
depresses the perceived price of the good even beyond what would be
attainable using only a low-salience tax.
Another possibility for implementing 9* is that the government can
redesign its existing tax instruments so that 9* falls within their range. When
9* < 9,, this entails redesigning ti (or a different tax) so that its salience
declines. If the government had perfect control over the salience of its tax
instruments, it would of course set 9 exactly at 0* and rely on it alone; but
even without perfect control, the government can still achieve 9* as long as it
can reduce a below 9* and then employ it in conjunction with th." Even when
the government cannot reduce 9, all the way to 9*, it can still improve
consumer welfare through any reduction in 9 because doing so brings the
attainable degree of salience closer to 9*.
How in practice can the government redesign its tax instruments to alter
their salience? Brian Galle helpfully summarizes some possible approaches,
many of which draw upon research from the marketing literature. One
possible way to reduce salience is to split a tax into multiple smaller charges,
based on evidence that consumers tend to underestimate total prices when
payments are split up into smaller parts." Another option is to change the
58. Of course, it is possible that similarly designed taxes and subsidies may have different
degrees of salience because consumers do not treat taxes and credits symmetrically. In such
cases, the appropriate salience value to use is that of the available subsidy instrument.
s. Because the subsidy reduces revenue, the value of the low-salience tax must be greater here
than when no subsidy was present. Subsection II.C.2 discusses the possibility that taxpayers
become more attentive as a tax's size increases. If so, the tax-subsidy combination approach
may not be feasible for reaching very low values of salience.
60. Note that the low-salience instrument must be a tax rather than a subsidy because net
revenue must be positive in order for the government to meet its revenue requirement.
61. Thus even when the government can employ differently salient taxes together, it is still quite
valuable to learn more about how to design taxes in low-salience ways.
62. Galle, supra note 4, at 70-72; see also Krishna & Slemrod, supra note 3 (outlining the
behavioral implications of various tax design choices).
63. Krishna & Slemrod, supra note 3, at 193-94.
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timing of the tax - for example, by delaying its imposition until after a
consumer has made the initial purchasing decision (perhaps by levying taxes
through a "buy now, pay later" approach, or by adopting a tax regime in which
taxpayers pay taxes on certain consumption expenditures well after the initial
time of purchase). Finally, policymakers may be able to reduce a commodity
tax's salience by imposing the tax in a complicated way-for instance, by
incorporating it into the income tax. For example, one could imagine phasing
out some other income tax credit or deduction in proportion to a consumer's
expenditures on the taxed good. Although clearly quite speculative, these
approaches highlight the range of policy tools through which governments
might attempt to lower the salience of their tax instruments. The fact that such
design changes may help policymakers achieve important efficiency advantages
underscores the need for more empirical research in this area.
In summary, policymakers attempting to implement 0* may run into the
problem that 9* is outside the range of salience associated with the available
instruments. In certain cases, policymakers may surmount this problem by
combining taxes and subsidies or by redesigning an available tax instrument
to raise or lower its salience. When such options are not available, however,
the next best approach will often be to rely fully on the tax with salience
closest to 0*.
2. Changing Attentiveness to Low-Salience Taxes
Thus far I have assumed that a tax designed with a given degree of salience
is associated with a fixed level of consumer responsiveness. That is, by defining
a tax's salience, 9, in terms of how much consumers adjust their demand in
response to the tax, I have implicitly assumed that there is a constant mapping
between the tax's design and the degree to which consumers account for it.
One might imagine, however, that consumers' attentiveness to low-salience
taxes is not actually fixed, but rather varies in systematic ways. For example,
one would expect a consumer to account more for a $5 sales tax than for a
$0.05 one. More generally, the 0 associated with a particular tax design may
increase as policymakers rely more heavily on that tax for revenue.1 If
64. For example, such effects might emerge from what Galle refers to as intentional ignorance
models, in which taxpayers account for low salience taxes if and only if the utility benefits of
doing so outweigh the associated cognitive costs. Galle, supra note 4, at 81-82; see also Raj
Chetty, Adam Looney & Kory Kroft, Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence 30-33 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13,330, 2007), http://www.nber.org
/papers/w13330.pdf (discussing a range of cognitive mechanisms that may give rise to
observed salience effects).
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consumers do tend to grow more attentive to low-salience taxes as
governments rely more heavily on them, the efficiency benefits of raising such
low-salience taxes would decline.
In thinking about the barriers that changing attentiveness to low-salience
taxes poses to the implementation of 0*, several points are important to keep
in mind. First, the mere fact that the salience associated with a particular tax is
changing does not affect the calculations for identifying the efficient degree of
salience (0*). That is, changing attentiveness might affect one's strategy for
implementing 0*, but does not affect the target (0*) itself.6 , If consumers'
attentiveness to the available tax instruments changes too quickly to achieve
0, that fact underscores the need for more research into methods of designing
taxes in ways that consumers will ignore, even at high amounts.
Second, changing attentiveness to low-salience taxes might not interfere
with the implementation of & if the changes are not too drastic.
Unfortunately, there exists virtually no empirical evidence concerning the
dynamic relationship between attentiveness to low-salience taxes and tax size.
As long as attentiveness to the low-salience tax remains small enough to reach
9* at the level of the tax needed to satisfy the efficient salience formula, 0* can
still be implemented in the normal way. If attentiveness to a particular tax does
turn out to change too quickly to be useful in implementing 9*, policymakers
would have to employ a different tax instrument or settle for relying more
heavily on the low-salience tax less than would otherwise be efficient. The fact
that some researchers have found evidence consistent with a salience effect for
large purchases" - for which the size of the tax is non-trivial - suggests that
certain salience effects would persist for at least some increases in tax size.
Finally, policymakers could mitigate the problem of changing attentiveness
to low-salience taxes by spreading such taxes out across different goods. If one
65. However, closely related to changing attentiveness is the notion that low-salience taxes are
associated with psychic costs, which would affect our conclusions about the desirability of
implementing 0 *. Such issues are discussed infra in Section III.C.
66. See, e.g., Kelly Sims Gallagher & Erich Muehlegger, Giving Green To Get Green? Incentives
and Consumer Adoption of Hybrid Vehicle Technology, 61 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 1 (2011)
(documenting patterns consistent with a salience effect for hybrid automobile subsidies);
Richard L. Ott & David M. Andrus, The Effect ofPersonal Property Taxes on Consumer Vehicle-
Purchasing Decisions: A Partitioned Price/Mental Accounting Theory Analysis, 28 PUB. FIN. REV.
134 (2000) (reporting evidence that car purchasers failed to fully account for vehicle
personal property taxes); Raj Chetty & Emmanuel Saez, Teaching the Tax Code: Earnings
Responses to an Experiment with EITC Recipients (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 14836, 2009), http://www.nber.org/papers/wl4836.pdf (finding that providing
personalized information about the tax consequences of the Earned Income Tax Credit
schedule affected taxpayer behavior).
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believes that a major factor associated with increasing attentiveness is the size
of the tax itself,1 collecting revenue from taxes on many goods could allow
policymakers to keep taxes on each good relatively small, and hence
attentiveness to each tax relatively low. Similarly, individuals' attentiveness to a
particular tax likely depends on the share of their budget they devote to the
taxed good.68 Consequently, policymakers may be able to maintain low levels
of attentiveness to low-salience taxes by levying such taxes on goods that make
up a relatively small share of consumers' budgets.
3. Taxpayer Learning
Another factor that might limit policymakers' ability to implement 0* is the
possibility that consumers would gradually account for low-salience taxes over
time as they come to learn about their presence. However, there are at least two
important limitations of this argument. First, although theoretically possible,
as of yet there is no empirical evidence that such learning effects are important
in practice; those who have investigated them have found no evidence of their
presence.69 Second, there is an important distinction between abstract
knowledge of a tax - which consumers may become aware of over time - and
accounting for that tax when making purchasing decisions. A tax that
consumers know about may still have low salience if it is not prominent when
consumers make their purchasing decisions. That is, a salience effect may
persist for taxes that consumers know about in the abstract if, because they are
not prominent, consumers do not consider them when making their
purchasing decisions. The distinction between having knowledge of a tax and
taking it into account at the time of purchase is bolstered by the research of
Chetty, Looney, and Kroft, who present survey evidence that consumers are
generally aware of sales tax amounts, even as they fail to account for them
when deciding which goods to purchase.70 When underreaction to taxes is
driven by salience rather than lack of knowledge, there is no reason to expect
that consumer learning will tend to raise a tax's salience over time.
67. See Chetty et al., supra note 64, at 30-33.
68. That is, consumers are more likely to find it worthwhile to account for a low-salience tax
that is levied on a large share of their purchases than for a low-salience tax that is only levied
on a small share of their purchases. This claim can be derived formally from Chetty, Looney,
and Kroft's "bounded rationality" model. See id. at 27-35-
6g. Chetty et al., supra note 12, at 1163; Goldin & Homonoff, supra note 22, at 25. In fairness, it
should be noted that these studies investigating taxpayer learning were not so conclusive as
to definitively rule out such effects.
7o. Chetty et al., supra note 12, at 1165.
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A related type of consumer learning that might limit policymakers' ability
to implement 9* involves consumers gradually accounting for the effects of
low-salience taxes on their overall purchasing power, even while failing to
account for the effects of the taxes on the prices of the taxed goods. Put
differently, after a tax is imposed, consumers may gradually come to realize
that they have less income by the amount of the tax, but still fail to consider the
tax's effect on relative prices. That consumers might learn to account for low-
salience taxes in this particular way was a possibility raised by Chetty, Looney,
and Kroft" and subsequently embraced by Gamage and Shanske."
If we accept Gamage and Shanske's claim that consumers are likely to
account for the effect of low-salience taxes on their budgets, we can think of
policymakers as being constrained by a lower bound on 0. Policymakers would
not be able to reduce 9 below the point at which consumers entirely ignore a
tax's substitution effect but fully account for its income effect, a level of
responsiveness we can call 9 .7 If Gamage and Shanske are correct, and
consumers really do behave in this way, then as an empirical matter the
salience of the available tax instruments could be no lower than 0 . Because 0*
is lower than W ,' policymakers would frequently find 9* to be outside the
range of the available tax instruments, discussed above in Subsection II.C.i. In
such cases, governments would be able to improve consumer welfare by
combining low-salience taxes with high-salience subsidies, or by searching for
ways to redesign taxes so that consumers fail to account for some of the tax's
income effect.7 1
Finally, Gamage and Shanske admit that consumers may not fully learn to
account for a tax's income effect when taxes are imposed on irregular purchases
or when there are long delays between purchases and tax assessments. In such
cases, the authors conclude that their argument for reducing market salience
may no longer hold. However, even in such instances, the approach presented
above remains valid: one can empirically measure the degree to which
consumers respond to the low-salience tax (i.e., its 0), and from that
71. Cherry et al., supra note 64, at 29.
72. Gamage & Shanske, supra note 4, at 68-69. Although certainly plausible, Gamage and
Shanske's claims are somewhat speculative in that they lack empirical support.
73. Using the notation from Section II.B, 9 = (41)/-.
74. This follows from the assumption that demand for the taxed good is not so sensitive that
raising a fully salient tax would actually decrease revenue.
7s. Of course, one might object that even such redesigns would eventually become high salience
because of consumer learning. One potential approach for dealing with that possibility
would be for the government to frequently adjust the sizes of its low-salience taxes, thus
reducing the likelihood that consumers will learn to account for those taxes' income effects.
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information combined with the efficient tax formula, compute the combination
of available tax instruments that will best promote efficiency.
To summarize, this Part provided a formula to identify the efficient degree
of salience for a taxed good and explained how governments can use the
available tax instruments to bring about that target level of salience. For most
governments, however, promoting efficiency is not the only goal of a tax
system-other social priorities are important as well. The remainder of this
Note discusses how policymakers should incorporate non-efficiency
considerations when manipulating the salience of commodity taxes.
III. TAX SALIENCE AND OTHER SOCIAL GOALS
Thus far I have described how policymakers can identify the efficient
degree of tax salience for a particular good-that is, the level of salience that
raises the required amount of revenue while minimizing harm to consumers.
The complications I have discussed above concern practical difficulties with
implementing 0*, but even with those difficulties, 0* remained the appropriate
target; the question was only whether the target was feasible. In this Part, I
discuss various considerations that should (in certain circumstances) cause
policymakers' target salience to depart from &.
A. Corrective Taxes
Section II.A derived the efficient degree of salience in the context of taxes
designed to raise revenue. As discussed in that Section, efficient taxes are less
than fully salient because lowering a tax's salience reduces the extent to which
consumers change their behavior in response to the tax, thus lowering the tax's
avoidance costs. Put differently, the efficiency advantage of low-salience
taxation is that it alleviates the undesirable behavioral changes associated with
taxes designed to raise revenue.
For an important class of commodity taxes, however, changing consumers'
behavior is one of the tax's primary goals. For example, when some behavior
generates harmful effects on others, governments can improve social welfare by
imposing a so-called Pigouvian tax on the behavior that creates this externality,
causing individuals to internalize the negative consequences of their
decisions. Similarly, governments may use taxes to influence behavior for
paternalistic ends, such as cigarette taxes that aim to reduce the prevalence of
76. See, e.g., ROSEN, supra note 32, at 92-94.-
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smoking.77 Whether the corrective tax is Pigouvian or paternalistic, the
mechanism by which it achieves its goal is by prompting individuals to change
their behavior. Additionally, because corrective taxes can bring in significant
revenues, they are especially attractive to policymakers struggling to meet a
budget. Thus corrective taxes often serve the dual goals of raising revenue and
shaping taxpayers' behavior.
What degree of salience should policymakers aim for when the goal of a tax
is to change behavior as well as raise revenue? On the one hand, the greater the
fraction of the tax levied in a low-salience way, the less consumers will pay
attention to the tax and the less they will adjust their behavior in response."
The same aspect of the low-salience design that was a benefit when the tax was
intended to raise revenue constitutes a disadvantage when the tax is designed
to alter behavior. For example, a cigarette tax imposed at the register will be
less effective at reducing smoking than a tax included in cigarettes' posted
price. As such, to the extent that changing behavior is the exclusive purpose of
a tax, policymakers should design the tax so that as high a fraction as possible
is presented in a high-salience way.
On the other hand, the more that policymakers impose a corrective tax in
low-salience ways, the more revenue the tax will bring in. In general, when a
government imposes a tax, consumers reduce their consumption of the taxed
good. Because low-salience taxes reduce consumers' substitution away from
the taxed good, a tax imposed in a low-salience way will bring in more revenue
than a high-salience tax of equal size. To illustrate, a $0.o cigarette tax raises
more revenue when added at the register than when it is included in the posted
price because consumers purchase fewer cigarettes when faced with the latter.
For these reasons, the salience of a corrective tax plays an important role in
shaping its relative effectiveness at raising revenue versus changing behavior.
Thus in the case of taxes designed to shape behavior, the simple formula
for efficient taxation must be modified: a tax intended to affect taxpayers'
behavior should have higher salience, all else equal, than a tax designed solely
to raise revenue.7 9 Inspection of an adjusted formula reveals that the basic
-7. See, e.g., 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 130/2 (Supp. 2012) (levying a tax on cigarette purchases). Of
course, such taxes can often be justified on nonpaternalistic grounds as well. For example,
cigarette smoking generates negative externalities in the form of secondhand smoke.
78. See supra Section I.A.
79. Finkelstein, supra note 23, at 979-80. In the presence of an externality, the formula for target
salience becomes9**= 0 *+'(x)/((1 -xq)(t +t )(y)), where 0"denotes the efficient
degree of salience in the case of an exrernaliy, 4'(x) denotes the marginal social cost
associated with the taxed good, y is a parameter that reflects the curvature of the utility
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properties of the efficient salience formula discussed in Part II carry through.
The only difference is that the target level of salience should be greater than
0*; how much greater depends on how much policymakers prioritize
behavioral change over revenue collection.o
To illustrate the importance of tax salience in the corrective tax context,
consider the case of "junk food" taxes. In response to soaring obesity rates
nationwide, a number of public health advocates have called for states to adopt
taxes on foods such as candy or soft drinks in order to promote healthier
eating."' In light of many states' increasingly dire fiscal situations, the fact that
these taxes have the potential to raise significant revenues makes them
particularly appealing.
Implementing a tax on junk foods, however, requires confronting an
important practical question: what form should the tax take? Junk food taxes
may be designed in a number of ways, with varying degrees of salience. For
example, many states exempt food items from their general sales tax or tax
them at a lower rate. As such, one way to levy a junk food tax is to exclude
targeted foods from the general sales tax exemption. In Connecticut, for
example, most food purchases are exempt from the state's 6% sales tax rate,
but soft drink purchases are not.az Similarly, in Illinois, most food items are
taxed at 1%, but candy and soft drinks are subject to the general sales tax rate of
6.25%.8' These sales tax exemptions have particularly low salience; the tax does
not appear in the posted price and only affects purchasing decisions to the
extent that consumers remember which foods are taxed and which are not.84
functions, and 9 * is computed as before from the efficient salience formula in Section II.A.
Goldin, supra note 46, at 14.
so. See Finkelstein, supra note 23, at 979-80. It is interesting to note that the approach
prescribed here concerning corrective taxes appears generally consistent with the way many
taxes are set in practice. Most commodities are only subject to sales taxes. See State
Comparisons, FED'N OF TAx ADM'Rs, http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/tax_stru.html (last
updated Jan. 1, 2012). This makes sense assuming that the efficient degree of salience for
those goods is less than the salience of the sales tax, and that the sales tax has the lowest
salience of any available tax. On the other hand, goods that are subject to excise taxes (which
have higher salience) include cigarettes, alcohol, and gasoline, id. -all goods that generate
externalities or for which policymakers may have paternalistic concerns.
81. See, e.g., Kelly D. Brownell & Thomas R. Frieden, Ounces of Prevention- The Public Policy
Case for Taxes on Sugared Beverages, 360 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1805 (2009).
82. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-412(9) (2011).
83. 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/3-10 (2ooS).
84. To illustrate, it might be helpful for readers to ask themselves how much sales tax is owed
on a $i bottle of soda in their home states. My experience presenting this research suggests
that even many tax scholars are not too confident in their answers. Remembering which
goods are covered by the tax can be harder than it appears. In Illinois, for example, candy is
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Consequently, one would expect that junk food taxes designed in this manner
would be more effective at raising revenue than at reducing obesity."
Instead of manipulating the general sales tax exemption on food, states
may also tax junk foods through excise taxes on manufacturers or retailers. For
example, Arkansas imposes a tax of $2 per gallon of soft drink syrup, and
Tennessee levies a tax of 1.9% of gross receipts on soft drink manufacturers.1
Because these excise taxes are passed on to consumers through changes in the
posted price of the taxed foods, they are fully salient. Thus implementing a soft
drink tax as an excise tax would likely be more effective at reducing the
consumption of unhealthful foods but less effective at raising revenue.
Although proposals for taxing junk food have received considerable
attention, the question of how salient such taxes should be has been largely
neglected." What the above discussion indicates is that this neglect is
unfortunate, as the question of the tax's salience plays a central role in
determining how effective it will be at reducing obesity and raising revenue. In
particular, the analysis here suggests that levying a greater fraction of the tax
through a posted tax design will be more effective at reducing unhealthy food
intake, whereas relying more heavily on a sales tax exception will bring in more
revenue. Regardless of which goal policymakers decide to prioritize,
recognizing the importance of salience will allow taxes to be better tailored
toward their intended objectives.
defined to exclude food products containing flour, so that caramel-coated popcorn is taxed
but a Kit-Kat bar is not. Id.
85. This hypothesis finds some support in the empirical literature. See, e.g., Jason M. Fletcher,
David Frisvold & Nathan Tefft, Can Soft Drink Taxes Reduce Population Weight?, 28
CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y 23 (2010).
86. ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-57-904(a)(1) (2012).
87. TENN. CODE ANN. 5 67-4-402 (2012).
88. Some proponents have argued for a posted tax on grounds other than salience as well. E.g.,
Brownell & Frieden, supra note 81, at 1807 (arguing for an excise tax on sugary soft drinks
both on salience grounds and because excise taxes are fixed based on quantity of beverage
rather than register price). Others have argued that either a posted or a register tax would be
desirable. E.g., Carolyn L. Engelhard, Arthur Garson, Jr. & Stan Dorn, Reducing Obesity:
Policy Strategies from the Tobacco Wars, URB. INST. 23-25 (2009), http://www.urban.org
/UploadedPDF/411926-reducing-obesity.pdf.
8g. It would be wrong to conclude from the above discussion that low-salience taxes can never
be effective in shaping behavior. As Section III.B will argue, it may often be the case that
low-salience taxes are more noticeable for low-income consumers. This observation is
important here because many corrective taxes aim particularly at shaping the behavior of
low-income consumers. In the case of junk food taxes for example, low-income
communities are among the most affected by obesity, which is associated with such diseases
as Type 2 diabetes and heart disease. See Pub. Health Serv., The Surgeon General's Call to
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B. Distributional Effects of Tax Salience
My focus so far has been on how policymakers can manipulate salience to
minimize the burden of a tax on consumer welfare. However, an important
concern with many commodity taxes is not only their effect on the welfare of
the average taxpayer, but the distribution of their burden across taxpayers of
different income groups. If a tax's salience affects not only its efficiency, but
also the distribution of its burden, policymakers concerned with equity should
take distributional effects into account when choosing a target level of
salience.9 o
Should policymakers concerned with equity design taxes with salience
higher or lower than 0*? Answering that question requires understanding the
relationship between tax salience and regressivity. Unfortunately, the existing
legal scholarship has come to mixed conclusions, with most authors
acknowledging that it is theoretically possible for low-salience taxes to either
increase or decrease regressivity. 9 ' In this Section, I explain the mechanisms by
which salience can affect tax regressivity and briefly discuss new empirical
research that sheds light on the matter.
To understand the basic mechanism by which low-salience taxes can affect
regressivity, consider a government that must raise a fixed amount of revenue
by taxing a particular good and must decide how salient to make taxes on that
good. Suppose that there are two groups of consumers: attentive ones (who
fully account for low-salience taxes) and inattentive ones (who do not fully
account for low-salience taxes). If the government imposes a high-salience tax,
both attentive and inattentive consumers will respond to it, reducing their
demand for the taxed good accordingly. As in the standard case, this reduction
Action To Prevent and Decrease Overweight and Obesity, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. 13-
14 (2oo), http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/ibrary/calls/obesity/CalltoAction.pdf. If low-
income consumers, compared to high-income consumers, are relatively responsive to low-
salience taxes, then low-salience taxes may be able to bring about most of the desired
changes in behavior while still raising large revenues from the high-income consumers who
fail to take the tax into account.
go. Louis Kaplow has forcefully argued that policymakers should focus primarily on efficiency
considerations when designing social policy and address distributional concerns through
adjustments in the income tax. See Louis KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC
ECONOMICS (2oo8). Indeed, Gamage and Shanske rely on this reasoning in suggesting that
one should focus primarily on efficiency considerations rather than distribution in assessing
the desirability of salience changes. Gamage & Shanske, supra note 4, at 74-78. However, it
seems unlikely that the result (the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem) underlying Kaplow's claim
would extend to the case in which commodity and income taxes were differently salient
because its derivation assumes perfect optimization on the part of consumers.
gi. See, e.g., Galle, supra note 4, at loo-o4; Nussim, supra note 4, at 246-47.
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in demand requires the government to raise the tax rate high enough to bring
in the needed amount of revenue.
Consider now what happens if the government imposes a low-salience tax
instead. In that case, only attentive consumers will reduce their demand for the
taxed good. Inattentive consumers will continue consuming the good as before.
Consequently, the reduction in aggregate consumer demand that typically
accompanies a tax increase will be attenuated. As a result, the government will
need to raise the tax rate less than in the high-salience case in order to bring in
the needed amount of revenue; the final magnitude of the tax will be lower
when the tax is low-salience than when it is high-salience. Because their
income goes further when tax rates are lower, attentive consumers will be
strictly better off under the low-salience tax.92
What does this result mean for regressivity? Reducing the salience of a tax
redistributes its burden from attentive to inattentive consumers. The crucial
question is thus whether high- or low-income consumers are more attentive to
low-salience taxes. That is, low-salience taxes will be less regressive than high-
salience taxes if low-income consumers are more likely than high-income
consumers to take low-salience taxes into account when making purchasing
decisions. In contrast, when high-income consumers are more attentive to low-
salience taxes, reducing the salience of a tax will exacerbate its regressivity.
It is by no means obvious which income group is likely to be more attentive
to low-salience taxes. In his recent article, Brian Galle hypothesizes that high-
income consumers tend to be more attentive to hidden taxes because they have
more education and better resources for avoiding cognitive errors than lower-
income consumers do. 93 Although Galle's argument is certainly plausible, it
seems likely that this reasoning applies most strongly to contexts such as an
income tax, where calculating an activity's tax consequences is a complicated
matter and high-income consumers are able to afford expensive accounting and
tax planning services to which low-income consumers lack access. Another
factor suggesting that high-income consumers might find it worthwhile to be
more attentive is simply that they tend to spend more on most goods and
consequently stand to lose more by misallocating their income through
budgeting mistakes.94
92. Inattentive consumers might be better off as well, but the benefits from facing the lower tax
will be offset by the budgeting mistakes that the low-salience tax prompts them to make. See
Goldin & Homonoff, supra note 22, at 4-10.
93. See Galle, supra note 4.
94. Another important factor that might push high-income consumers to be more attentive for
some goods is the fraction of their budget spent on the good in question. See Goldin &
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In the context of commodity taxation, however, there are also good
theoretical reasons to expect low-income consumers to be more attentive than
high-income consumers to low-salience taxes. In particular, the cost of
ignoring a sales tax is typically only a few dollars that could have been spent on
other goods. Because the marginal utility of income declines with wealth,
however, the value of those few dollars will be much greater for lower-income
consumers than higher-income ones. Hence, lower-income consumers have a
much greater incentive to take the sales tax into account when making
purchasing decisions. Moreover, although low-income consumers tend to be less
educated than their high-income counterparts,95 it seems likely that many have
the skills necessary to take (an approximation of) the sales tax into account.
Recent empirical findings also lend support to the claim that low-income
consumers tend to be more attentive to low-salience taxes in at least one
context. In a recent work, Tatiana Homonoff and I investigated income
differences in consumer attentiveness to low-salience cigarette taxes.96
Cigarettes are taxed in two ways in the United States: through an excise tax,
which is included in cigarettes' posted price, and through a sales tax, which is
typically added on when consumers check out at the register. By linking survey
data on individuals' cigarette consumption to cigarette excise and sales tax
rates, we investigated whether high- and low-income consumers responded
differently to changes in the two types of taxes. Whereas both high- and low-
income consumers responded to cigarette excise tax changes (which are fully
salient), only low-income consumers reduced cigarette consumption following
increases in the sales tax on cigarettes (which are less than fully salient). These
results are consistent with the hypothesis that attentiveness to low-salience
cigarette taxes declines as income increases. Hence, at least in the case of
cigarettes, concern for reducing a tax's regressivity may well prompt
policymakers to aim for a target level of salience below 9*."'
Homonoff, supra note 22, at 35-38 (setting out a formal framework for considering whether
attentiveness to a low-salience commodity tax increases or declines with income).
9s. See generally CLAUDIA GOLDIN & LAWRENCE F. KATZ, THE RACE BETWEEN EDUCATION AND
TECHNOLOGY (2008).
96. Goldin & Homonoff, supra note 22.
g. One final situation in which low-salience taxes may end up benefitting low-income
taxpayers occurs in the context of refundable income tax credits, such as the Earned Income
Tax Credit (EITC). (I owe this example to James Mahon.) The EITC works by effectively
supplementing the wages earned by qualifying low-income taxpayers. Although the tax
credit is designed to benefit low-income employees, some research indicates that it is
actually taxpayers' employers who end up capturing much of the program's benefits; a
taxpayer will be willing to accept a job for a lower wage if she knows that the wage her
employer pays her will be supplemented through a government program. Jesse Rothstein,
291
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
In addition to distributional issues that arise between consumers of
different incomes, a tax's salience also affects the distribution of its burden
between consumers and producers.98 To illustrate, suppose that the
government imposes a posted tax on soda purchases by consumers. Because
the tax is fully salient, traditional economic models of taxation imply that
soda's pretax price will decline so that producers and consumers share the
burden of the tax.99 If, however, the tax is less than fully salient, consumers are
less driven to substitute away from soda, and as a result, soda producers are
not forced to reduce the pretax price of soda by as much in order to maintain
demand. Thus the more salient a new tax is, the more its burden will fall on
producers. 00 Because the ultimate incidence of taxes borne by producers
depends on the relative importance of the factors of production used to
produce the taxed good, here too the effect of tax salience on progressivity is
likely to vary from good to good.
So far, I have argued that lowering the salience of a commodity tax shifts
the tax's burden from producers to consumers, and from attentive consumers
to inattentive ones. Thus even if one accepts that low-income consumers are
more attentive than high-income ones, the question remains whether reducing
tax salience lessens the burden on low-income consumers, or whether those
effects are more than offset by the shifting of the tax's burden from producers
to all consumers.
By combining the mechanisms discussed in this Section into a single
model, it is straightforward to show that reductions in tax salience are most
likely to benefit attentive consumers when the supply of the taxed good is
relatively sensitive to price.1 o' To understand this result, recall that the more
The Unintended Consequences ofEncouraging Work: Tax Incidence and the EITC (Ctr. for Econ.
Policy Studies, Working Paper, 20o8), http://www.princeton.edu/gceps/workingpapers
/165rothstein.pdf. When the tax benefit is low salience, however, the taxpayer is less likely to
consider it when deciding whether to accept a job, and as a result, her employer may be
forced to pay a higher wage.
gs. Cherry et al., supra note 12, at 1169.
g. The amount by which the pretax price declines in response to a new tax depends on the
relative sensitivity of demand and supply of the taxed good. See, e.g., Don Fullerton &
Gilbert E. Metcalf, Tax Incidence, in 4 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC EcoNoMICs 1787 (Alan J.
Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 2002).
100. Note, however, that the distributional effects of tax salience manipulations will only affect
the incidence of the tax between consumers and producers for goods when the incidence of
the tax is not fully passed on to consumers. That is, when producer supply is substantially
more elastic than consumer demand, the tax will already fall completely on consumers and
reductions in salience will not matter.
1o1. The precise condition required is that re > 1, where , denotes the price-elasticity of supply
for the taxed good. Goldin & Homonoff, supra note 22, at 36.
292
122:258 2012
SALES TAX NOT INCLUDED
price-sensitive the supply of a good is, the more taxes on that good are passed
on to consumers through increases in the pretax price.o 2 In contrast, when the
supply of a good is relatively inelastic, producers must absorb high-salience
taxes on that good. In such cases, replacing a high-salience tax with a low-
salience one (to which some consumers are inattentive) allows producers to
shift some of the tax's burden back onto consumers, increasing the after-tax
price faced by attentive and inattentive consumers alike. Thus low-salience
taxes offer the best chance of progressivity when the supply of the taxed good
is relatively sensitive to price.
In summary, salience shapes the distribution of a tax's burden in two
important dimensions: between producers and consumers collectively and
among consumers who differ in their attentiveness to low-salience taxes. When
low-income consumers are more attentive to low-salience taxes, policymakers
concerned with equity should choose a target level of salience below 0* in
order to increase the tax's progressivity. On the other hand, when low-income
consumers are less attentive to low-salience taxes, policymakers should err on
the side of relying more heavily on high-salience taxes. Although these
prescriptions are straightforward, they can only be implemented for a
particular good once policymakers understand whether attentiveness to low-
salience taxes on that good is increasing or decreasing in income. For this
reason, it is clear that more empirical work is needed in this area.
C. Psychic Costs Associated with Low-Salience Taxes
In addition to externalities and distributional concerns, another factor that
policymakers should consider before implementing 0* is the possibility that
low-salience taxes might generate direct psychic costs to the consumers who
face them. For example, a consumer might suffer disutility from engaging in
the mental calculation required to account for a sales tax, when that calculation
could have been avoided if the tax had been included in the good's pretax price
instead.' 3 If such psychic costs are important, the value of & that emerges
from the efficient tax formula will be too low; that is, by neglecting a cost
102. See Fullerton & Metcalf, supra note 99, at 1797.
103. For a discussion of a model that considers such costs, see the bounded rationality model in
Chetty et al., supra note 64, at 27-35. An additional consideration comes about when one
considers imposing low-salience taxes of differing amounts on each taxed good, as the
efficient salience formula implies. In that case, consumers who choose to account for all such
taxes may face an additional burden not only because they must account for the low-salience
tax, but also because they must remember which tax rate is levied on which good.
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associated with low-salience taxes, the formula suggests that policymakers
should try to lower salience more than is actually desirable.o 4
The failure of the efficient tax formula to account for the possibility that
such psychic costs are associated with low-salience taxes certainly constitutes a
limitation of the model. However, several factors may limit the practical
importance of this omission.
First, the mere presence of a salience effect does not imply the existence of
psychic costs. Consumers may fail to account for low-salience taxes even when
the computational costs of doing so are negligibly small, such as when an
individual's failure to account for a low-salience tax is unintentional, or is
intentional but irrational.'o
A second possibility is that low-salience taxes may actually be associated
with substantial psychic costs, but because of those costs, boundedly rational
decisionmakers choose to ignore the tax when making their purchasing
decisions."o' In such cases, the consumer will suffer no direct utility costs when
faced with the low-salience tax, and the efficient salience formula will continue
to apply.
Finally, even when consumers do suffer direct psychic costs when
confronted with a low-salience tax, Chetty, Looney, and Kroft show that the
magnitude of those costs may well be quite small. That is, because of the
nature of the costs and benefits of accounting for low-salience taxes, relatively
small psychic costs can motivate substantial inattention on the part of
consumers.1o7 Consequently, omitting such costs from the efficient salience
formula may be less misleading than one would otherwise believe.
D. The Democratic Legitimacy oflmplementing 9*
One final objection that might be raised against a government
implementing 9* is that low-salience taxes are fundamentally undemocratic, in
104. Chetty et al., supra note 12, at 1171 (noting that the excess burden formulas they derive are
exclusive of increases in cognitive costs). A related issue is the distribution of these psychic
costs. If lower-income consumers are more likely to choose to suffer these costs to avoid
misallocating their budgets, then the incidence of these costs could well be regressive.
105. See Galle, supra note 4, at 81-85 (exploring how taxpayer decisions to neglect low-salience
taxes may arise from nonrational behavior).
1o6. By boundedly rational decisionmakers, I mean individuals who account for the low-salience
tax when the utility of avoiding the budgeting mistake exceeds the disutility of taking the
tax into account. See Chetty et al., supra note 64, at 27-35.
107. More precisely, the argument is that the utility loss from ignoring low-salience taxes is
second order with respect to the tax's size. Chetty et al., supra note 12, at 1165.
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that they allow policymakers to escape accountability for the taxes they
impose.'o In addressing this objection, it is important to distinguish between
political salience -that is, the extent to which taxes elicit a political response on
the part of taxpayers - and market salience- the aspect of tax design that affects
economic decisionmaking.'09
Although the focus of this Note has been on market salience, my results
also speak to the legitimacy of low-salience taxes from a democratic theory
perspective. First, fully informed taxpayers may prefer and vote for taxes that
are less than fully salient. In particular, consumers themselves are generally
better off when taxes are designed in a way that encourages them to make some
mistakes.
Second, it is political-not market-salience that matters for political
transparency and accountability. Taxes with low market salience can have high
political transparency, and vice-versa. For example, a sales tax has low market
salience because it is not prominent when consumers choose which goods to
buy, but it probably has high political salience because voters are reminded of
its presence every time it is separately added at the register. In contrast, an
excise tax has high market salience - it shows up in the posted price - but low
political salience because consumers are rarely presented with the size of the
tax. Hence the low-market-salience sales tax may end up being more politically
transparent than the high-market-salience excise tax. As such, manipulating
tax salience in ways that foster efficient tax policy is unlikely to be an effective
strategy for a government seeking to mislead its citizens."o
CONCLUSION
Policymakers make decisions about tax salience -whether they intend to or
not-every time they levy a new tax. In light of the mounting empirical
evidence that such choices have real effects on taxpayers' behavior, this Note
1o8. A related objection is the notion that any attempted government intervention in the
decisionmaking of its citizens is paternalistic and inherently undemocratic. Such issues are
far outside the scope of this Note.
iog. See Gamage & Shanske, supra note 4, at 54-58; Schenk, supra note lo, at 272.
11o. A related point is that consumers may still have knowledge of low-salience taxes-and
consider them when voting in elections -even when they are not prominent at the time that
purchasing decisions are made. See Chetty et al., supra note 12, at 1165. For much more on
the question of the legitimacy of low-salience taxes from a democratic theory perspective,
see Gamage & Shanske, supra note 4, at 79-98, which criticizes arguments in favor of high
political salience; and Schenk, supra note to, at 297-99, which argues that taxes with low
political salience are justified given that they constitute a politically palatable means of
reducing staggering deficits.
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has called for increased attention to salience in the design of commodity
taxes."' Whereas previous legal scholarship has focused on the all or nothing
choice between high- and low-salience tax designs, I argued that the most
efficient policy is generally to combine high- and low-salience taxes. In
particular, I derived a straightforward formula for the efficient combination of
high- and low-salience tax instruments and explored how the efficient solution
varies depending on the characteristics of the good being taxed. My results
suggest that policymakers should avoid including all commodity taxes in a
taxed good's posted price and should instead levy some or all of the tax in a less
salient way (e.g., by utilizing a register tax).
After investigating a number of potential barriers to implementing the
efficient degree of salience, I expanded my model to account for objectives
other than simply maximizing consumer welfare. In particular, I argued that
policymakers seeking to adjust taxpayer behavior should typically rely on a
higher fraction of high-salience taxes than suggested by the efficient tax
formula. Policymakers attempting to reduce a tax's regressivity may also
manipulate salience to achieve their goals, but doing so successfully requires
careful empirical study of the good in question. Across all of these dimensions,
a better understanding of tax salience can foster substantial improvements in
the design of tax policy.
m. Although this Note has focused on salience in the context of commodity taxes, many of the
results speak to broader questions of tax policy. In particular, the same guidelines that
promote efficient commodity taxation also yield insights into income tax design. On the
other hand, income taxes also pose unique distributional considerations: policymakers can
tailor the salience of the income tax to particular income groups in a way that is not possible
under commodity taxes, where all consumers face the same tax rate. For example, complex
requirements for claiming the Earned Income Tax Credit likely impose a very different
distributional burden than do those of the Alternative Minimum Tax.
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APPENDIX
This Appendix derives the efficient tax salience formula discussed in Part II
of this Note. For simplicity, I assume that the government has perfect control
over the salience of the tax that it imposes. A more technical article relating to
this Note derives the result for the case in which the government is constrained
to choose between two instruments with fixed salience.n2
Suppose that society is composed of a representative consumer who divides
her income between some taxed good x and a composite of all other goods y.
For convenience, I assume that utility is concave, smooth, and additively
separable in x and y, U(x, y) = u(x) + v(y). The consumer's budget constraint
takes the form BC: y + (p + t)x = I, where p represents the pretax price of x,
t represents the tax on x, I is income, and the price of y is normalized to 1.
Following Chetty, Looney, and Kroft, I assume that tax design enters utility
only through consumption"3 and that consumers choose rationally when faced
with fully salient taxes."'
Consumption is determined in two steps. First, the consumer chooses her
intended consumption bundle according to her perceived budget constraint
BC : y + (p + Ot)x = I, where 0 e [o, 1] represents the salience of the tax.
The (x, y) pair that maximizes utility subject to the perceived budget constraint
is the intended consumption bundle (i, '). The presence of the 9 parameter
reflects the empirical evidence that consumers fail to fully account for low-
salience taxes; the less salient the tax-the smaller the value of 9 -the less the
consumer takes the tax into account when choosing her intended consumption
bundle. Note that the intended consumption bundle will generally fail to
satisfy the true budget constraint (BC).
Because consumption decisions must ultimately be feasible, closing the
model requires specifying how infeasible intended consumption bundles are
mapped into feasible final consumption bundles. To pin down final
consumption, I assume that accidental overspending on x is offset by reduced
expenditures on y. In the model's notation, x = x and y = I - (p + t) ."s This
assumption is natural for the case in which y represents all goods other than x
and individuals make at least some of their consumption decisions after
112. See Goldin, supra note 46, at 4-5.
113. I discuss possible violations of this assumption in Section III.C, supra.
114. See Chetty et al., supra note 12, at 1170.
is. Note that I am implicitly assuming x to be a small enough portion of total consumption so
that an agent's intended consumption of x is never infeasible, even after taking the register
tax into account.
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purchasing x; consumers who accidently overspend on x will have less income
available to spend on their remaining purchases (which are all part of y). n'
We are now in a position to investigate how changes in the tax affect
consumption. Holding income and pretax prices fixed,"' we can express demand
as a function of the tax's size and its salience, x = x(t, 6) and y = y(t, 0). Note
that when the tax is fully salient (i.e., when 0 = 1), the perceived budget
constraint matches the true budget constraint and hence intended
consumption matches final consumption. In that special case, final
consumption corresponds to the solution of the standard utility maximization
problem:
Equation (1).
(x(t,i), y(t,i)) = arg max U(x, y) s.t. B.C.
x'y
In contrast, when 0 < 1, the final consumption bundle will not satisfy (1).
Although the pretax price of x and the tax enter the true budget constraint








Similarly, because tax salience only affects utility through the perceived
budget constraint, we can write:
116. In principle, one could choose a different rule for mapping consumers' suboptimal
decisionmaking into feasible consumption bundles. In other work, I show that the
qualitative insights identified here are robust to variations in the budget-adjustment rule
that one employs. See Goldin, supra note 46; see also Chetty et al., supra note 64, at 28-30
(discussing budget-adjustment rules).
117. As Chetty, Looney, and Kroft argue, pretax prices may indeed respond to tax salience.
Chetty et al., supra note 12, at n67-69. The normative implications of this observation are
explored in Chetty, supra note 43, and in Goldin & Homonoff, supra note 22, at 33-34.
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Equation (4). cx a
Equation (5). ax
ao ap
To incorporate tax policy into the model, consider a government that must
raise a fixed amount of revenue, R , from taxes on x. How should the
government set the tax's size and salience to accomplish this goal while
minimizing harm to consumers? The lower the salience of the tax, the less
consumers substitute demand away from the taxed good, and hence the lower
the size of the tax needed to raise the required amount of revenue. Totally
differentiating the government's revenue constraint, R = tx (t, 9) , yields the







How does a revenue-neutral reduction in a tax's salience affect consumer
well-being? Indirect utility is given by V (t, 9) = u(x(t,9)) + v(y(t, 9)), so
that the welfare effect of a salience change can be found by totally
differentiating V subject to the government revenue constraint:
Equation (7).
dv ax 8t at
= -(r+- )(u'(x)-(p+t)v'(y))-v'(y)x-d 0 &p 80 80I
A Taylor approximation can help us express (7) in more intuitive terms. Let
(x*, y*) denote the optimal final consumption bundle-the bundle a rational
consumer would pick if the tax were fully salient, x*(t,9)=x(t,1) and
y*(t,0) = y(t,1). Taking first-order Taylor approximations of u'(x) and v'(y)
around (x*, y*), and using (1), allows us to write:
Equation (8).
U'(x)- (p+tOv' (y) = (X -x*)y
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where y - u"(x*) + (p + t)' v"(y*). Similarly, the first-order Taylor
approximation of x around x* allows us to write:
Equation (g).
x - x* -(i - 0)t
ap
where 
- is evaluated at (x*,y*).
ap
Substituting (8) and (9) into (7) allows us to express the conditions under
which a revenue-neutral increase in salience will raise consumer welfare:
Equation (io).
dV 8x 8x
__ '!o (i -96_)y- v,'(y*)+(p+t)t-(i- )v"(y*)dO a p 8p
Finally, recall that at the optimal consumption bundle, one can express
demand in terms of the utility function" 8 :
H- v'(y*) ax _ (p+t)v"(y*)
-= - and -
ap y BI y





where the income elasticity of x is
ax I
7x,, aI X
the compensated own-price elasticity of demand for x is
9 D N (p + t)
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the budget share of x is denoted by
(p + t)x
and the uncompensated own-price elasticity of demand for x is
x (p + t) -
x p x, ptx bd ( =*+,p
All elasticities are evaluated at the optimal consumption bundle (x*, y*).
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